Physician Profiling: Policy Options to Improve Efficiency in Medicare by Williams, Jackson
Each year, Amcrica's rapidly rising health care
costs become the focus of congressional attention as
physicians seek relief from Medicare reimbursement
cuts. Such cuts are typically mandated by the
Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) formula, intended
to hold physician expenditures to a target amount
tied to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).' Physician
expenditures continue to grow excessively relative to
GDP, and policymakers are struggling to find a way
to contain these costs.
One tool that might be employed is "physician
profiling," that is, comparing physicians to each other
and using the results in different incentive programs.
IHealth plans and other payors are using episode-
grouper softwxare to measure physicians' resource
use as one way to profile physicians. Typically, the
softxw-are groups file claims for services related to a
patient's diagnosis, including services provided by
the physician, tests and diagnostic work, services
provided by specialists, and inpatient and outpatient
procedures.4 IThe software's programming logic then
attributes the resources to a single physician, defines
the beginning and end of the episode, and separates
out services related to other conditions that the patient
may have. Ihe resulting product is a profile that
compares the efficiency (and sometimes the quality) of
care delivered by different physicians to patients with
similar conditions.'
Policyrmakers have discussed possible uses for
this information. The least aggressive use of this
information is for confidential reporting. Some hope
that if phy sicians become aware of how they compare
to others. the will modify their practice pattern.
More intrusive uses include public disclosure as a basis
for pay-for-performance bonuses or penalties,. to place
low-resource-use physicians on preferred tiers, and
exclude high-resource-use physicians from a network
altogether.
Profiling may offer promise as a way to rid the health
care system ofinefficiency-believed by many experts
to constitute up to 30% of expenditures.' Adoption
of these techniques by Medicare, however, will likely
provoke conflicts and difficult choices.
This article will discuss the research findings about
variations in physician resource use and how private
plans have used claims data to distinguish between
efficient and inefficient physicians. It will note some
of the conflicts that have arisen from, and challenges
involved in, measuring individual doctors' efficiency.
Next, the article addresses policy options for Medicare
to improve physician efficiency. Finally, it discusses
the difference between individual accountability
and shared accountability approaches to evaluating
physician performance.
IBackground
The rationale for pursuing accountability-based
approaches to paying physicians is well stated by the
Institute of Medicine (I1M) in the introduction to its
report on pay -for-performance, Rewarding Provider
Performance: Realigning Incentives in tiMeicare:
T-he current Medicare fee-for-service payment
system is unlikely to promote quality
improvement because it tends to reward
excessive use of services: high-cost, complex
procedures, and lower-quality care. Through
bundled and prospective pay ment arrangements
for institutions, Medicare has attempted to
create incentives for efficiencies, but significant
price and payment distortions persist.
The National Quality Forum (NQF) has summarized
what is at stake:
Waste in the healthcare system has a negative
impact on indiv idual patients and populations.
All encounters wxith the health sy stem expose
patients to some dcgree of risk, and the
provisionl of unnecessary serxvices to patients
cxposes them to more potential harm than
good, not to mcntion inconxvenience and often
monetary costs. The proxvision of unnecessary
services to patients also consumes resources
that could have been used to benefit others in
the population (i.e., the uninsured)."
It is important to note at the outset that no one expects
that efforts to make Medicare more efficient will occur
in isolation from efforts to measure and improve
clinical quality. Indeed, efficiency is considered one
of the six "domains" ot quality as defined by the 10M
in its seminal report, Crossing the Quality Chasrn.
Technically, efficiency encompasses quality, as it
implies a relationship between benefit and cost.12
However, this article uses the term "efficiency" in the
sense of curbing excess resource use, as distinguished
from "clinical quality."
Experience in the private sector, as well as studies of
Medicare claims, indicate that there is considerable
variation in the resources different physicians use to
treat similar patients." Private insurance plans have
used physician profiling to spur less efficient doctors
to emulate their more efficient peers. I' Poliey analysts
inside and outside of government urge Medicare to try
to alter the behavior of inefficient physicians. As the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
has argued:
[T]he nation could spend less on health care,
without sacrificing quality, if physicians whose
practice styles are more resource-intensive
reduced the intensity of their practice-that is,
if they provided fewer diagnostic services, used
fewer subspecialists, used hospitals and intensive
care units as sites of care less frequently, and
perfoimed fewer minor procedures."
What is referred to here as the individual accountability
approach is heavily influenced by the experience
of private health plans with pay-for-performance
programs and selective contracting in PPOs." The
individual provider is the unit for which performance
is analyzed (since the provider could be a group
of physicians, the term "individual" is a shorthand
expression heie). Examples ot measures that use
prosviders as the unit of analy sis are Medicare's
Hospital Compare and Phy sician Quality Reporting
Initiative (PQRI) process mneasures.i It is inmportant
to note that the rated phy sicians may be held responsible
for sersviees they nmay not hasve furnished or, indeed, tor
sersvices osver which they had little influene?
As the 1OM report noted, "etficiency measures are
still largely under desvelopmcnt." " The tollowsing
discussion clearly indicates that pitfalls assait those
attempting to implement use of such measurements
for individual doctors. Medicare is taking a first, small
step in this direction, but several commentators have
suggested that further steps should be taken, following
the trail blazed by private insurers.
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A number of studies that use physician practices as
the unit of analysis find wide variation in resource
use intensity for similar patients, and suggest that the
Medicare program would save a substantial amount of
money if more doctors adopted the practice styles of
those at the high end of the efficiency distribution.
Jonathan Weiner examined three sets of physician claim
data to derive risk-adjusted efficiency comparisons,
finding that:
[The] difference in the case-adjusted efficiency
between the 30% of physicians that represent
the most efficient cohort, and the 30% that are
the least efficient, was consistently at least .8 vs.
1.2 of average (average is set at 1.0) for all three
databases. This means
ssas taken into a'count) t$
used on aserage 20%o less
sersvices than expectedI
hile the patients of the
least efficient cohort ot
phy sicians used serv'sices
that wecre 20%o more than
expected.~
MedPAC explored svaa
tions in physician resoure
use utilizing episode-gouper softw are supplie'd by
eommercial sveindors.21 T his softw are allosss coin-
parisons of die asverage resource use of plhysic inns for
siniilar episodes insvohsving similar patients. MedPAC
studied variation aniong sexeral phy sician specialties
and found that tor ophthalmologists, dermatologists.
internists, cardiologists and alleigists, resource use per
episode varied twsotohd oi niore between physicians in
the highest and lossest deciles of inltensity.2
Thle Governmeint Accountability Office (GAOG) identi-
tied "outlier' phy sicians as generalists ssho sasv a
disproportionate share of beneticiaiies wsho acciued
medical bills that were unusually high, consideiing
their hcalth status."3 After taking health status and
location into account. GAOG tound that:
Medicare patients who saw an outlier
generalist-compared with those who saw other
generalists-wsere 15 percent more likely to
have been hospitalized, 57 percent more likely
to have been hospitalized multiple times, and 51
percent more likely to have used home health
services. By contrast, they were 10 percent less
likely to have been admitted to a skilled nursing
facility. We concluded that outlier generalists
were likely to practice medicine inefficiently.2
A recent report from the Center for Studying Health
System Change (H SC) described how private insurers
have responded to variations in physician efficiency
by identifying "high-performance networks that
encourage enrollees to choose network physicians who
score well on measures of efficiency and quality."
These insurers have used the episode-grouper software
to determine whether physicians complied .with
recommended processes during a treatment episode,
as well as the total cost of an episode.26
HSC reported that:
HIigh-performance networks typically are
not distinct products, but rather an option for
use across different product platforms, most
commonly preferred provider organizations
(PPOs).
The exact specifications of high-performance
networks differ across plans. The most
common model uses tiered-provider levels,
with corresponding enrollee cost-sharing
differentials. IThe first tier consists of the high-
performing providers: the second tier consists
of the remainder of in-netxork providers:
and the third tier consists of out-of-network
providers. Employers often do not differentiate
cost sharing between the first and second tiers,
offering these networks only as a source of
information to their employees about which
providers have better performance.27
HSC noted, hoxxwTever, that at least one health plan
cut the loxwest performxing "outlier" phy sicians
from its netxxork altogether, and that another xwould
consider taking this step as wxell for phy sicians xxho
fail to change their wxay s exven after receiving specific
information on hoxx to inmprove." Conxversely, one
prominent insurer. United IHealthcare, is paying
additional reimbursements to phy sicians in its top tier.
Based on the prixvate plan experiences, HiSC identified
sexveral barriers to the operation of tiered netxxorks
as follows. First, a perceived lack of legitimacy of
efficiency measures is apparent when different data
sets, different ranking systems, or different cutpoints
result in the same physician being designated as
superior by one insurer but not by another, or being
designated superior one year but not the next.
Variation in scores can be explained by different prices
negotiated with different purchasers, yet physician
perception of inequities has resulted in pushback.29
Employers' reluctance to take the heat for the stern
measures needed to enforce a tiered network (i.e.,
telling enrollees they must pay more to see particular
physicians, especially when doing so may disadvantage
enrollees in particular locations). T I here was a lack of
evidence that tiered network s lower health care costs or
inducing widespread change in physician behavior.31
While the rollout of individual measures has been
rocky, resistance could be expected in an early-adoption
phase during which there is a lack of standard measures
or benchmarks, disparate insurers analyzing different
data, and some clumsiness on the part of insurers in
introducing the programs to doctors. Presumably,
some of these deficiencies can be overcome by the
time that Medicare adopts efticiency measures. On
the other hand, as will be discussed below, several real
obstacles will provide challenges.
N/-Policy O)1ptions for Medicare
Implementation of any policies based on physician
profiling is complicated first by questions about whether
episode-grouper techniques are sufficiently refined
to effectively measure physician resource use.32Cer
tainly, none have undergone the sort of scrutiny that
has been afforded to quality and patient experience
measures promulgated by quality promotion
organizations such as the NQF or National Council for
Quality Assurance. Issues related to accuracy, validity,
and risk-adjustment pose unanswered questions.
Accuracy issues would include the inability to attribute
patients to the appropriate doctor when multiple
doctors see the patient, incomplete clinical information
in claims data, or an insutticient nunmber of episodes
involving a specitic condition trom xwhich to calculate
reliable measuies.
Validity issues relate to wvhat constitutes tlhe "correct"
intensity of resource use tor a gixven episode. In tlhe
absence of cxvidence as to best practices, benchmarks
may be based instead on coaxvenience, such as axverages
oi arbitrary peicentiles. Validitv, oi the perception of
validity, can also be hindered by a lack of stakeholder
consensus and the opacity of proprietary softxxare
programs.
Measures that do not properly account for the severity of a patient's illness
would not only be inaccurate but could also discourage physicians from
treating the sickest patients. A separate but similar issue arises from patient
behavior that doctors cannot control, such as patients' failure to adhere to
treatment plans or healthy lifestyles, inability to afford prescription drugs,
or demands for specific expensive services.34
Policymakers hoping to spur greater efficiency among physicians delivering
care to Medicare patients can choose from a menu of policy options. The
options span a continuum that ranges from voluntary and collaborative
quality improvement efforts to increasingly rigorous approaches.
VL Feedback
The mildest policy option is for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to provide confidential feedback to physicians about
how their resource use compares with that of peers. The rationale for this
option is physician professionalism. As MedPAC observed, "[m]any
phy sicians are highly motivated individuals who have continually strived
for high grades and peer approval. If identified as having an unusually
resource-intensive style of practice, some physicians may respond by
reducing the intensity of their practice."1 In fact, CMS is already preparing
a demonstration project that will use the episode-grouper softwsare to
provide feedback to physicians on selected illnesses.3
MedPAC also observed:
Evidence on measuring the effectiveness of resource use in containing
private sector costs is mixed and varies depending on how the results
are used. Providing feedback on use patterns to physicians alone has
been shown to have a statistically significant, but small, downward
effect on resource use, but, when paired with additional incentives,
the effect on physician behavior can be considerably larger.
MedPAC may be overly optimistic in assuming that providing feedback
on resource use with an appeal to doctors' professionalism would have
the positive effect that it has in the clinical quality context. First, physi-
cians may disregard feedback viewed as lacking validity and reliability.
Second, the appeal of feedback to a doctor's professionalism would have
to overcome a very compelling countervailing force: the fee-for-service
sy stem's incentive to provide more care. TFhe "target income hypothesis"
holds that physicians maintain a volume and intensity of practice sulfficient
to achieve their preferred balance of profit and leisure.38
It may be that the "inefficient or "outlier" physician is busy, a bit
disorganized, and simply has a caxalier attitude tossard the use of resources;
this physician aight be interested in learning about her peers best practices.
On the other hand, she may have a relatively small patient load and "induce
demand' loi frequent cxvaluation and management xvisits or ieferrals to her
oswn ancillary seivices, such as imaging, to maintain her standard ot living.
To be efficient, this phy sician might hasve to adxvertise or take emergency
ioom duty to build a taiger patient base, or relocate trom an area saturated
by a high concentration of phsysicians to a rural community. The phsysician
may be forced to forgo income necessary to amortize an investmcnt in
equipment.
Further along the incentive continuum is the concept of public reporting
of physician efficiency. Efficiency reporting could come to pass by two
possible avenues. First, Medicare could take the lead in tabulating and
releasing efficiency measures. This approach is embodied in S. 1544,
legislation co-sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH ) and former
Senator H1illary Clinton (D-NY) in the 110th Congress.39 This bill would
authorize the creation of Medicare Quality Reporting Organizations which,
under contracts with fthe Department of IHIealth and luman Services (HH1S),
would publicly release quality and efficiency reports based on Medicare
data.40
Second, other entities, such as states, public interest groups, or commercial
vendors could use Medicare claims data to tabulate and disseminate the
infornation. Consumer advocates had hoped that the claims data needed
to measure individual physicians' resource use would be available to the
public through the Freedom of Information Act, but a recent. court decision
has cast doubt on that possibility.41 It is not clear whether public reporting
could begin to move forward .without any further legislative or executive
action.
"Iransparency" has been the focus of several major health care initiatives in
recent years, including those of the recent Bush Administration. Measuring
and reporting price information was one of the four cornerstones of that
administration's Value-Driven lealth Care initiative. HH11S has already
begun posting the prices of various discrete procedures, but has
acknowledged that "measurj ing]I the overall cost of services for common
episodes of care and the treatment of common chronic diseases" is a
necessary second step in achieving cost transparency.42
A prominent private-sector effort is the Consumer-Purchaser Disclosure
Project, which advocates public reporting of efficiency measures as a
'path to significant savings in health care." 4' Citing the Weiner research
referenced above and other similar research,. it contends that "Medicare
and other purchasers could save from 2% to 4% of total costs if only one
out of ten beneficiaries were to move from less efficient to more efficient
physicians." 44 The group has also called for HHS to release Medicare
physician billing data to private insurers to enable better comparisons of
provider efficiency.
Reporting of efficiency measures may be a double-edged sword--skeptical
consumers, left cynical in the wake of perceived managed-care excesses,
could view an "efficient" physician as one who skimps on care, and see
physicians with more intense resource use as those who are willing to go
the extra nile for their patients. For reporting of efficiency measures to
haxve the intended effect, the public mxust feel assured that 'inefficiency'
means additional care that provides no marginal benefit.
Progress tossard ptublic reporting of efficiency measuies is hindcied by the
concrns over the accuiacy, validits, and risk adjustment issues outlined
abosve. These concerns are magnified in the public reporting context
because, xwith re.putations and patient relationships at stake, phy sicians haxve
not hesitated to litigate disputes osver these issues. At present, doctors in
Connecticut are in court challenging txwo insurers' designations of superior
practitioners as "a fraud upon the public and a libel against the plaintiff
physicians" who were not so designated.4 Doctors in New York State
persuaded the State Attorney General to threaten lawsuits against three
insurers planning similar programs,46 although that dispute has been settled
as described belowx.
Judicial precedents relating to bond-rating agencies suggest that public
reporting of physician efficiency ratings would be protected by the
IFirst Amendment, even if a court agreed that the ratings were useless
to consumers.47 lowever, threats of litigation could discourage private
entities from taking on this already intimidating task. It is clear that all
stakeholders would be better off if a consensus could be reached in advance
regarding ways in which to develop resource measures that are accurate.
scientifically valid, and do not create perverse incentives for doctors to
avoid the sickest patients.
I fforts toward such consensus measures are under way. In early 2007,
the Integrated I lealthcareAssociation, aCaliforniaconsortium thatpioneered
pay -lor-performance prograns, announced that it would develop efficiency
measures to pair with its previously established quality criteria48 Later the
same year, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) committed $16
million in grants to build a multiple-payor database to measure and report
on physician perforrnance. RVJF said that the project, to be overseen by
the Quality Alliance Steering Committee, would:
I[Work] in collaboration with the NQF endorsement process to
identity measures of cost for 20 common conditions, resulting in
a new set of measures that take into account appropriate use of
resources and provide a broader picture of quality of care for these
conditions. 49
IFinallx, negotiations spurred by the New York State dispute resulted in a
multi-stakeholder agreement announced April 1, 2008, which will permit
insurer-sponsored performance measurement programs to go forward,
subject to review by a "nationally-recognized,. independent health
care quality standard-setting organization."so This "Patient Charter"
contemplates scrutiny of heretofore "black box" ranking mechanismss and
the eventual development of standards for resource use measurement that
will have comparable legitimacy to currently accepted quality measures.
lowever, at least one additional lawsuit has been filed by physicians
subsequent to the agreement.I
VIIL. Tiered Networks
A further step toward applying pressure on physicians would be for
Medicare to adopt the tiered netxsork approach that some prtsvatc plans
hasvc taken. In a January 1998 report, the National Academy of Social
Insurance's (NASI) Study Panel on Fece-Fror-Service (FFS) Medicare
retommended that Medicare experiment wxith "best pratictes of prisvate
health plans, including "PPs, perhaps in xwhich beneticiaties lace losser
Medicare premituns in cxchange lot a designated PPO) ph>ysician."52IThe
panel obscrxcd that, "[wx ith its large market share and stgniticant data
resources. FFS Medicare is in a ielatively good position to identify and
select prefcrrcd prosvidcrs on thc basis of quality or coss."~
Eighteen months later, NASI's rccomnmendation was echoed in a Clinton
administration white paper on modernizing Medicare. That paper proposed
creating a "Medicare Preferred Provider Option," to be administered
by "existing organizations with PPOs." To create the PPO network,
"practitioners' and providers' claims history and quality information
would be assessed. Only those applicants with a demonstrated history of
cost-eflective medical practice patterns would be selected as preferred
providers."5 Under the Clinton proposal, beneficiaries choosing the PPO
option would have lower cost-sharing responsibilities.
Both the N ASI and Clinton administration papers cited the prevalence of
preferred provider networks in the private sector, but neither addressed
what long-term impact they intended a tiered network to have within FFS
Medicare. One rationale for tiering doctors is that the variation in resource
usage as a given and ask beneficiaries who choose to stay with less efficient
doctors to internalize more of the costs that their choice imposes on the
program as a whole. However, this approach assumes that patients have
made a conscious choice to stick with an inefficient doctor. One question
for Medicare in particular is whether there is sufficient access to doctors in
the preferred tier. By definition, any preferred provider network limited
to a given upper percentile of high-quality, efficient providers will have
a limited capacity to absorb patients. Ihus, some beneficiaries may be
unable to access a top-tier physician because of patient load constraints, not
because of choice. For these patients, charging a higher premium or higher
co-insurance exacerbates the misfortune they are already experiencing as a
result of their inability to access an above-average physician.
Another rationale for tiering would view the preferred provider netwxork
not as an end in itself, but as a means for influencing physician behavior.
In other words, the ultimate expected outcome would not be a two-tier
system, but rather a single tier operating at a higher level of performance,
driven by the financial threat to practitioners who do not achieve
an acceptable level of efficiency. If this could be accomplished, the
inconveniences caused by tiering would be temporary, but Would still cause
burdens on beneficiaries during a turbulent implementation period.
IX. Pa m nt Ti ed , t o rPe rf,1No.rma ne
The ideal endpoint of physician payment policy reforms would be an
environment in which physicians who provide care of high clinical quality
with appropriate resource use are paid more than physicians who provide
less value per unit of work. Ihe current system of administered pricing does
not allow for differential fees for the most skilled or most efficient doctors.
In a pay-for-performance regime, some entity would assess doctors' value
and adjust fees accordingly.
Two major pay-for-performance efforts currently underway that reward
ph>ysicians for both cfflciency improvcmneitts and clinical quality are the
U nited Hcalth Care (UH-C) Practice Rewsards prooram and Medicare's
Ph>ysician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration.
The UHC program is based on "episodic efficienc,"" wisxth rewsards in the
form of higher pay. U HC's episode-groupcr software sorts phy sicians along
quality and resource use dimensions. It requircs ph>ysicians first to qualify
on the basis of clinical quality as indicatcd by claims for the prosvision of
guideline-msandated care. After meeting that threshold, ph>ysicians are
then ranked on resource use."~ Imagining a grid in xxhich ph>ysicians arc
placed v ertically trom top to bottom on a quality axis and ranked fi'onm i'ight
to left on an efficiency axis, physicians lxing in the upper right quadrant
are eligible for enhanced fees during the year following their designation,
receiving a five percent increase to their commercial flee schedule.
As 1. 1he IOM noted that another option would be to "'penalize providers who
exhibit 1. 1he worst performance or the least. e-11ort -to improve."" J'his could
involve withholdina some fraction of reimbursements from physicians
whose performance does not meet efficiency standards. As the IOM
observed, '"such a system could generate considerable resistance arnong
providers [and] providers who were not confident of their ability to improve
might refuse to participate."59
The Phvsician Giroup Practice Demonstration is based upon "longitudinal
efficiency," 60 with rewards in the form of shared savings. For each physi-
cian group practice (PGP),, Medicare savings from the demonstration are
calculated by comparing actual spending each program year
to the PGPs own base-year per-capita expenditures,
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nature of the practice of medicine, with many solo or small group-
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MedPAC staff researchers, recently returned from a. series of site visits
on the topic.. reported to the Commission that health plans see physician
resource use measurement as representing .'the future" of health care. 65
Certainly, the news that the Integrated Healthcare Association and the
QASC are initiating rnulti-stakeholder efforts as well adds to a sense of
inevitability about the concept. J'he question for policymakers is how to
incorporate efficiency ineasures into Medicare payment policy. Given
the unsustainable rate ofarowth projected for the program, doing nothing
is not an option. Inefficient resource use is also an urgent concern for
Medicare berieficiaries, who are responsible for Part. 13 premiums
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the proceedings of voluntary quality measurement
organizations, congressional or agency action could overrule
ol jections and charter ain alternative process for endorsing efficiency
measurement algorithms. UTnder the Ncational 'Fechnology 'Transfer and
Advancei-nent Act, government policy favors the use of standards setI Zn
bv voluntarv consensus bodies such as NQF. But the Quality Advisory
-Board proposed. in S. 1544 provides an example of how NQF could be
sidestepped if necessary. Finally, 1-11 --- I-S could post efficiency measures
on its website., as it has with hospital quality, measures.
The third option, tiering Medicare physicians, poses more thorny problerns.
practice styles of their doctors. As a result, they would be punished for their
doctors' inefficiency, at least in the short run. If there were no meaningful
opportunity for patients to switch doctors, the intended
incentives might not work in the long run, either.
Similarly, patients in rural areas might be served by
only a few doctors. If all were placed in a lower tier,
the patients could have no choice but to pay the higher
rate.
Medicare could closely scrutinize "outlier" doctors
identified through profiling and exclude from the
program those who (do not change their practice patterns
even after receiving actionable feedback. This could
be disruptive to beneficiaries' established relationships
with physicians. The effect on beneficiaries depends
on how many physicians were excluded from the
program - if relatively few were excluded., this could
affect existing relationships less than a tiering strategy
that placed many physicians on a tier requiring higher
cost sharing. Care would need to be taken to ensure
that doctors are labeled as "outliers" only because
thex are truly recalcitrant and not because they serve
a particularly ill patient panel. One assumption
underlying these physicians' practice style is that they
work largely in areas that have a high concentration
of physicians.67 Care needs to be taken to verifb this
assumption to ensure that patients do not experience
access problems as the result of physicians' exclusion.
Ultimately, beneficiaries and taxpayers will benefit
most from a system that most directly aligns payment
with performance. Achieving this will not be easy. A
payment structure that rewards episodic efficiency
might miss the bigger picture. MedPAC found that
when observed on a per-episode basis, physicians in a
high-cost region could appear to be more efficient than
those in a low-cost region.68
As noted earlier, efforts to assess the resource use
of individual physicians face daunting obstacles in
terms of accuracy, validity, and risk adjustment. If
resource use evaluation indeed represents "the future"
of physician payment policy, it will be necessary to
design transparent measurement mechanisns that
address all such concerns to the reasonable satisfaction
of stakeholders. Doctors wxho haxve felt aggrieved by
efficiency measures haxve thus far turned to the courts
andl state attoiney s general to oxverturn pivate citforts
-one imagines that if they felt f ederal measures we re
unfair, they xxould tuin to C ongress. Policy makers
need to keep close xxatch on the ongoing priv ate-
sectoi eff oits to ensure that a public-domain product
that can be used bx Medicare ev entually emerges. If
such efforts lag, the Pedciral Governent may haxve
to proxvide research funding and perhaps a back-up
process for certifying efficiency measures so that
physician consent to an ultimate NQF imprimatur is
not unreasonably withheld.
Among major advantages of individual physician
measures are that they xwould allow the Medicare
program and others to learn from physicians who
use fewer resources while maintaining a high level
of quality. They permit a better understanding of
the differences between inappropriate volume growth
and appropriate growth (e.g., from technology
changes that improve care for patients); they generate
information that could be used to identify best practices
for the treatment of specified patients and conditions.
and they promote individual physician accountability
without requiring any large-scale restructuring of the
existing physician marketplace.69
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage is the difficulty
that individual doctors and small-scale practices would
face in re-engineering care processes. HSC researchers
have described the daunting obstacles overcome by
Virginia Mason Medical Center doctors in improving
their efficiency when excluded from Aetna's top tier.70
The ISC findings raise the question: IHow could
smaller provider organizations in non-supportive
cultures be expected to implement such sweeping
changes if salaried doctors in a large integrated delivery
system, supported by leadership trained in the Toyota
Production System and working in a community with
conservative medical care patterns, endured enormous
sacrifices in time and money to achieve efficiencies?
XL .1n div " iu, a IA c co u nt ab I 1,it y
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In its report on pay for performance, the IOM argued
that a primary goal of new payment incentives
should be "to stimulate collaboration and shared
accountability among providers across care settings for
better patient-centered health outcomes." As noted
earlier, physician profiling builds on the assumption
that individual physicians should be accountable for
resources used in treating their patients.
Physician profiling is an "individual accountability"
approach to efficienxcy, one wxhiclh respects the
traditional autonomy of the plhysic ian. In placiing tlhe
locus of accountability at the iindixvidual physician
lexel, it shares ihe iaek tamken by the lPQRl ameasures
and by the "Medical Hlome" model that xxould gixe
primary care phxysician practices a per-patient-
per-month pay meat, in addition to fee-for-serv ice
reimbursements, to coordinate the car e of chronically
ill beneficiaries.7
In contiast, a "shared accountability" appioach is
inspired by the staff and group models of physician
practices associated with health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) although not by the HMO
itself, as it maintains fee-for-service as its basis for payrment. "Shared
accountability" approaches would apply pressure on individual physicians
to act as though they were part of an integrated deliverx system. Several
leading health policy experts would like to see physicians grouped into
accountable care organizations" or "virtual networks."" These approaches
are based on the belief that integrated systems are more efficient and better
able to coordinate care across settings. Under these proposals, physicians
might be placed in pools based upon an "extended hospital medical staff"
that reaps bonuses or incurs penalties based on longitudinal measures of
quality (such as outcomes) or efficiency of care delivered to the entire
population served.74 Other models, involving "bundled payments," would
induce physicians and hospitals to cooperate to improve their efficiency in
treating acute episodes by paying (or reconciling payments) en bloc.
Because only a relatively small proportion of America's physicians are
organized into staff or large group practices, the individual accountability
approach is -viewed as better able to take the medical practice environment
as it is in formulating policy, rather than trying to reorganize it. Ihus,
PQRI adapts lealthcare Effective Data and Information Set (lEDIS)
measures designed for health plans for use at the individual physician level.,
and physician profiling could, in theory, devolve price competition from the
plan level to the individual physician level.
If the preferred attributes of integrated delivery systems-quality
measurement, efficiency incentives, and care coordination-can be
replicated through either individual accountability programs or shared
accountability programs, why would the IOM and many other health policy
experts recommend more complex and intrusive shared accountability
regimes? Based on an extensive review of research on the subject,
Laura ITollen argues that the cohesion, scale, and formal affiliations that
characterize organized delivery systems are responsible for their quality
and efficiency advantages. She further proposes that seven characteristics
of such systems create the dynamics necessary to achieve these advantages:
strong physician leadership, organizational culture, clear shared aims,
a governance structure, accountability and transparency, selection and
workforce planning, and patient-centered teams. 6
XIL. Conclus"ion
It is immediately apparent that although individual physician approaches
may be able to impose transparency and accountability and may pay for
creation of patient-centered teams to address chronic illness, they fall short
of creating the cohesixe peer relationships that -ould be fostered bx the
organized, shared accountability model. Phy sician profiling does create
some checks on peers-phy sicians deemed responsible for an episode
haxve an incentixve to refer to high-quality, efficient specialists. On the other
hand, some analy sts wxorry that once attribution rules are knoxxn, they
xxill be gamed. wxith PGPs immnediately referring out complex patients to
specialists? T~Ihe lack of longitudinal incentixves also could alloxx gaining
through the initiation of more episodes.
tn contrast, shared accountability proposals require organization and
leadership, and, in the ease of the accountable care organization, xxould be
profiling would be overseen by phy sician peers rather than by the
government. Of course, structures created to encourage these benefits
would also be potentially vulnerable to gaming.
It should be noted that both the individual and shared accountability
approaches are intended to respect physician and patient autonomy by
retaining, while restraining, fee-for-service payrment. In this regard, the
shared accountability proposals fall far short of capitated risk and managed
care practices that have troubled physicians and patients alike. When
satisfactory measures of individual physician efficiency are implemented,
policymakers will have to determine whether Medicare, in making
individual accountability rather than shared accountability the nonn, would
merely be recognizing as inevitable the fragmented nature of care delivery,
or would reinforce it.
likely to spawn governing structures and workforce planning. Other bene-
fits would include increased ability to tie pay to outcomes, increased
incentives for providers to coordinate care, and the fact that physician
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